Week #74 | Israel Weekly War Summary | March 2-March 8 ,2025
- IDSF
- Mar 10
- 18 min read
Overview
The ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas over hostage releases remain at an impasse, with both sides accusing each other of violating the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
Since the beginning of the war, 75,000 trucks have entered Gaza (20,000 of them since the ceasefire began). Hamas has stockpiled enough supplies to sustain itself for months, ensuring that its fighters have food and essential goods.
On March 6, several armed groups loyal to Bashar al-Assad launched a coordinated attack against the new Syrian government forces (Sunni fighters of Tahrir al-Sham).
The government sent reinforcements from Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Palmyra, Homs, and even southern Syria to suppress the Alawite revolt and committed atrocities against the Alawites.
Tehran is now attempting to create a new paramilitary force to challenge al-Julani’s rule and destabilize Syria from within. The objective is clear: to weaken the Sunni Islamist government before it consolidates power, ensuring that Iran maintains a foothold in Syria and can continue exerting regional influence
Photo Graphic
Gaza
Hostage Deal
The ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas over hostage releases remain at an impasse, with both sides accusing each other of violating the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
Despite the many times that Hamas has been caught violating the cease-fire agreement, including hording almost all of the humanitarian aid and withholding it from civilians, Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem accused Israel of failing to adhere to several key aspects of the truce, including not fully implementing humanitarian protocols, refusing to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor, and avoiding talks regarding the second phase of the agreement.
Senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi reiterated the group’s refusal to extend the first phase of the deal, insisting that Israel must implement it precisely as agreed. He dismissed any new negotiations and called on mediators to pressure Israel into fulfilling its obligations. Similarly, Osama Hamdan, Hamas’ representative in Lebanon, claimed that the Israeli decision to halt humanitarian aid to Gaza was a form of extortion, aimed at manipulating negotiations in favor of the Israeli government.
Against this backdrop, former U.S. President Donald Trump issued a direct threat to Hamas, warning that they must immediately release all hostages and return the bodies of those they had killed, or face severe consequences. Hamas dismissed Trump’s ultimatum, stating that his threats only complicated the ceasefire discussions and emboldened Israel to avoid honoring the agreement.
Reports from the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq channel revealed that Hamas had informed senior U.S. officials that it expected all hostages to be released as part of a broader, multi-stage agreement. Hamas was reportedly open to some flexibility regarding American hostages, expressing a willingness to engage in a goodwill gesture—but only if Washington pressured Israel into resuming humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza, as the humanitarian aid is a valuable currency that Hamas uses to control and subjugate the regular Gazans.
According to a Palestinian source speaking to Sky News Arabic, the United States proposed a deal in which Hamas would release 10 live hostages in exchange for a two-month extension of the ceasefire. This deal would also include reopening border crossings and restoring humanitarian aid shipments. Hamas has not yet responded to the proposal.
Meanwhile, the terrorist group released a video featuring Israeli hostage Matan Angrest, in which he was forced to criticize the Israeli government for abandoning the captives and insisted that the only way to secure their release was through a negotiated exchange. His statement aligned with Hamas’ longstanding narrative that a military rescue operation would be impossible.
Hamas has officially rejected the U.S.-brokered “Witkoff Plan”, though the group has not explicitly ruled out alternative proposals embedded within the broader American offer. However, the militant group remains adamant that any deal must include a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a permanent ceasefire.
At the opening of the Sunday cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that: Out of 59 hostages held in Gaza, only up to 24 are believed to be alive and at least 35 are presumed dead.
The mediators have failed to advance negotiations for the second phase of the hostage deal.
Hamas refused to accept the proposed deal, leading to an Israeli decision to immediately halt all truck and goods shipments into Gaza.
Humanitarian Aid and Its Impact
Since the beginning of the war, 75,000 trucks have entered Gaza (20,000 of them since the ceasefire began).
Hamas has stockpiled enough supplies to sustain itself for months, ensuring that its fighters have food and essential goods.
Meanwhile, prices in Gaza are soaring, and vendors are halting sales in fear of future shortages.
However, this is not a new situation, and the Palestinian population has already adapted to such crises, meaning this does not serve as an effective pressure tool against Hamas.
Hamas strategically released videos of its police enforcing price controls, showing Gazans struggling with food shortages while the group continues to hoard resources for its fighters.
The halt of humanitarian aid deliveries will not impact Hamas in the short term, as it has sufficient stockpiles for prolonged conflict.
U.S. Negotiations with Hamas
According to reports the US engaged directly with Hamas without Israel. Israel tried to scuttle the negotiations without its involvement after it found out that American officials visited Doha without their knowledge. Ron Dermer, had a tense call with U.S. hostage envoy Adam Boehler, several hours after Boehler met in Doha with Khalil al-Hayya, one of Hamas' most senior political officials and the head of its negotiating team..
Operational
Israeli aircraft carried out multiple strikes on suspected operatives in Gaza.
In northern Gaza, an airstrike targeted a terrorist cell attempting to plant an explosive device.
Additional strikes targeted individuals approaching Israeli forces and posing a threat.
Domestic Israel
A 70-year-old Israeli citizen was murdered, and four others were injured in a stabbing attack in Haifa. The attacker was an Arab-Israeli who had been living in Germany and returned to Israel a month ago.
Following the Haifa attack, Hamas-affiliated media outlets continued their incitement campaign for attacks during Ramadan.
One post read: “Between spirituality and Jihad… The resistance of Ramadan manifests in Haifa.”
This post, like others, included the hashtag “Ramadan Resistance”, which is part of an ongoing incitement campaign that launched at the beginning of Ramadan.
Incoming Chief of Staff
The incoming IDF Chief of Staff, Major General Eyal Zamir, conducted a series of visits to all combat zones over the past two weeks as part of his transition into the role. According to the IDF, he assessed operational readiness in Jenin, Gaza, and Lebanon, meeting with commanders to plan future operations, with an emphasis on offensive strategies. Zamir called for preparations for a prolonged, multi-front war.
As part of his statements, Zamir sent a message to the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community, calling for equal service obligations.
IDF and Shin Bet Investigations Into October 7th Failures
The main factors that enabled Hamas’s military buildup and the October 7th attack included:
Israeli policy of “keeping the quiet”, which allowed Hamas to amass military power.
Qatari financial support that was transferred to Hamas’s military wing for strengthening its capabilities.
A continuous erosion of Israeli deterrence over the years.
A defensive intelligence approach rather than preemptive strikes.
The cumulative impact of events at Al-Aqsa, the treatment of Palestinian prisoners, and perceived societal divisions within Israel.
The Shin Bet has tried to clear some responsibility from the agency pining the blame on the Israeli government. The report was seen as very controversial and politically motivated.
The report has said that: “There is no evidence that the agency underestimated Hamas as an adversary.”
The Shin Bet claimed to that it had repeatedly warned the Israeli government about Hamas’s increasing motivation to strike and assessed that Israel was entering a period of instability.
Operational and Intelligence Failures
Significant failures were found in managing the intelligence operations center on the night of October 6-7.
Warnings were misinterpreted, as analysts incorrectly compared Hamas’s activity to the holiday periods in 2022, which ended without attacks.
A newly developed early warning model was not used, even though it was validated two months earlier.
The Shin Bet admitted that intelligence collection in Gaza had deteriorated over the years due to operational restrictions.
The agency recommended targeting Hamas’s key terrorist planners in Gaza, but these recommendations were not followed.
The possibility that Hamas was engaging in deception (either tactically or strategically) was not sufficiently considered.
Hamas’s invasion plan was not considered a credible threat scenario.
The absence of a defined “reference threat” hindered intelligence gathering and decision-making in the crucial hours before the attack.
Hamas’s previous invasion plans (discovered 8 and 3 years earlier) were not adequately addressed.
Israel-US
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz spoke with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Katz thanked the U.S. for its accelerated arms shipments and military aid. Both sides agreed that Iran remains the main regional threat, and reaffirmed their commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Katz confirmed that Israel had accepted the U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff’s proposal regarding hostage negotiations.
On March 4, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The U.S. acknowledged Israel’s cooperation in hostage negotiations and efforts to extend the ceasefire in Gaza.
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) and the U.S. Air Force conducted a joint aerial exercise. The training focused on interoperability and enhancing joint capabilities for a range of regional threats. Israeli F-35i and F-15i fighter jets flew alongside a U.S. B-52 strategic bomber, practicing operational coordination. This reflects the growing partnership between the IDF and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
This show of force sends a message of deterrence to Iran as the exercise showed the aerial supremacy that the 2 militaries share and could use in an event of strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Judea and Samaria
The IDF released a report on the military operations in February:
25 terrorists were killed in security operations.
350 individuals were arrested.
120 illegal weapons were confiscated.
Hundreds of explosive devices were destroyed.
The IDF continues demolishing terrorist infrastructure in Nur al-Shams and Tulkarm refugee camps.
More than 40,000 residents have been left for over a month from these camps, including parts of Jenin.
Israeli security forces, including the IDF, Border Police, and Shin Bet, launched a raid on several neighborhoods in eastern Jenin, targeting terrorist infrastructure. During the operation, two militants were killed, one of whom was identified as the head of Hamas’ military wing in Jenin. In addition, three wanted individuals were arrested, and multiple weapons were confiscated. This marked the first officially documented use of the IDF’s “Eitan” armored personnel carrier, previously only seen in footage circulating on social media.
Meanwhile, in Hebron, the IDF demolished the homes of two terrorists who had carried out the deadly attack in Jaffa on October 1, an incident in which seven civilians were killed. This action was part of Israel’s broader counterterrorism policy of home demolitions aimed at deterring future attacks.
Israeli security forces destroyed an improvised bomb-making lab and a weapons cache containing 100 pipe bombs, 8 roadside explosive devices and a remotely operated detonation system.
Troops raided a drone manufacturing facility and several buildings used as terrorist infrastructure in Tulkarem, dismantling key operational sites.
Diplomatic
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) traveled to Egypt to attend the emergency Arab League summit on March 4, 2025. In preparation for the event, Abbas held diplomatic meetings with various leaders, including European Council President António Costa and Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid.
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with Egyptian officials to discuss the reconstruction of Gaza. Following his talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel-Atti, Mustafa expressed gratitude to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for his role in formulating a reconstruction plan. Abdel-Atti reaffirmed that the Cairo summit would focus on supporting Palestinian statehood while firmly opposing forced displacement.
Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary-General of the PLO’s Executive Committee, met with German National Security Advisor Jens Plötner in Ramallah to discuss regional stability and economic support for Palestinian governance.
Lebanon
Diplomatic
The U.S. administration announced a $95 million aid package for the Lebanese military, aiming to strengthen its capabilities amid rising regional tensions. This decision comes at a time when Lebanon remains deeply divided over the presence and role of Hezbollah.
Within the Lebanese political landscape, two members of parliament have called for setting a clear deadline to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities. In contrast, members of the Amal movement, a Shiite political faction, have advocated for allowing Hezbollah to maintain its weapons stockpile north of the Litani River, where the group retains substantial control.
Operational
Israel has continued its targeted strikes against Hezbollah operatives inside Lebanon. On Tuesday, an Israeli airstrike 10 kilometers inside Lebanese territory killed the naval commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, a key unit specializing in cross-border attacks. The following day, another Israeli airstrike near Naqoura targeted a group of suspected Hezbollah operatives loading weapons into a vehicle, neutralizing the threat.
These strikes reflect Israel’s strategy of creating a new status quo- preemptive action to degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, particularly in response to the group’s involvement in regional conflicts and its alignment with Iranian interests.
Syria
Druze in Syria
After statements by Israeli PM Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Katz who said they would support for the Druze in southern Syria following HTS sending forces to the south of the country, many rebuked the statements.
Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader in Lebanon, accused Israel of expansionist intentions.
The Syrian Druze leadership supports Syrian national unity but remains divided on autonomy.
Druze leaders in Syria fear suffering the same fate as the Alawites and avoid statements suggesting collaboration with Israel.
Israel is advancing a $3.9 billion five-year plan (2025-2029) for Druze and Circassian communities in Israel which could include a wider move to reinvigorate the Druze in Israel which would facilitate possible collaboration with Druze on the Syrian side.
In Suweyda, days after the formation of the “Military Council,” a new force called the “National Army” was established. This indicates the Druze community is making initial moves toward autonomy with Israel backing the move.
The government successfully negotiated security coordination with the Druze of Suweyda, aiming to prevent drug and weapons smuggling.
Clashes between HTS and the Alawites
Background
Since Assad’s regime collapsed three months ago, his former supporters have attempted to regroup. Assad’s former loyalists include: Intelligence officers, Military commanders, and Drug smugglers. They established a new Alawite militia to resist what they perceive as Sunni oppression and potential reprisals.
General Daith Dallah, former commander of the 4th Division, announced the formation of the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria”. He stated that its goal was to fight terrorists and liberate the country. It is possible that there is Iranian involvement, as Iran understands that sectarian violence could radicalize the Alawite population further.
New Clashes
On March 6, several armed groups loyal to Bashar al-Assad launched a coordinated attack against the new Syrian government forces (Sunni fighters of Tahrir al-Sham). The attack targeted Jabla, Beit Ana, and Dalia in Latakia province.
The Alawite fighters declared their intention to restore Assad to power.
Fighting also broke out in Tartus, prompting the new Syrian government to deploy reinforcements, including: Tanks, Armored personnel carriers (APCs), Drone units and Helicopters dropping barrel bombs.
Iran has issued multiple statements calling for an uprising against the “Takfiris” (a term used to describe Sunni Islamist groups) and supporting this move. Iran sees this as an opportunity to re-establish influence in Syria, given that Alawites constitute 2-3 million people, mostly in Latakia and Tartus.
Protests erupted across Syria (in at least 25 locations) in support of the government and calling for revenge against the Alawites.
The government sent reinforcements from Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Palmyra, Homs, and even southern Syria to suppress the Alawite revolt.
Many Sunni fighters are inexperienced, coming from newly established units in the past two months.
Some Sunni fighters belong to the Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror militia (SNA), which has previously fought the Kurdish SDF.
On Friday, March 7, Sunni forces recaptured the coastal city of Jabla, where Alawite resistance was strongest. They seized key population centers, arresting: General Daith Dallah and former Assad regime commanders
Clashes took place in at least 12 locations in northwest Syria.
Many Alawite rebels went into hiding, transitioning into guerrilla warfare. In rural and mountainous areas, Alawite fighters are preparing for a prolonged conflict.
Videos began circulating online documenting massacres of Alawites by the government. They engaged in extreme brutality, with reports of Marching Alawites on all fours before executing them, dragging bodies with ropes behind pickup trucks and other ISIS like tactics. Sunni fighters chanted revenge slogans, with some showing links to ISIS and Salafi jihadist groups
Thousands of Alawites fled to the Russian airbase at Hmeimim, which opened its gates to them. Many Alawites are fleeing to Lebanon, fearing further massacres.
Iran Establishes a New Militant Group in Syria
On March 5, reports emerged that Iran established a new militant organization in Syria, named “The Islamic Resistance in Syria.” This move comes as Iran attempts to restructure its influence in the region following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Tehran is growing increasingly concerned that the Shiite axis it has built is beginning to unravel, with Syria now becoming a weak link in its strategic corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq to Lebanon.
The downfall of Assad—who was a key ally of Iran—has significantly weakened Tehran’s land bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon, disrupting its ability to transport weapons and reinforcements to its proxies. The rise of a new jihadist government under Abu Mohammad al-Julani, a Sunni Islamist leader hostile to Iranian influence, has further isolated Tehran in the region.
Iran has a long history of meddling in Middle Eastern countries to topple Sunni regimes and replace them with Shiite-aligned militias. However, the new Syrian leadership has taken a hardline stance against Iran, blocking its ability to expand its hegemony in the Levant. The collapse of Assad’s rule, alongside significant blows to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, has severely undermined Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
In response, Tehran is now attempting to create a new paramilitary force to challenge al-Julani’s rule and destabilize Syria from within. The objective is clear: to weaken the Sunni Islamist government before it consolidates power, ensuring that Iran maintains a foothold in Syria and can continue exerting regional influence.
This new group will likely follow Iran’s traditional playbook of backing shadow militias to challenge existing governments while avoiding direct conflict. Tehran’s ultimate goal remains unchanged—preserving the Iranian-led regional order and preventing a full Sunni consolidation in Syria, which could permanently sever its ties to Hezbollah and Lebanon.
IDF Activity
The IDF has escalated its military operations in Syria, specifically targeting positions formerly held by the Syrian army in Alawite-controlled coastal areas. While some attacks were officially acknowledged, there were also unconfirmed reports of Israeli airstrikes near Damascus.
Additionally, the IDF reportedly destroyed an old Russian observation post in Quneitra and carried out a deep helicopter raid—16 km into southern Syria—the deepest operation to date.
Diplomatic
Britain and the European Union lifted sanctions on Syria.
The new Syrian foreign minister attended a chemical weapons non-proliferation conference in The Hague.
Turkey
On March 3, reports emerged that Israel had formally requested the United States to prevent Turkey from establishing three military bases in Syria. These bases are allegedly part of Turkey’s broader plan to build a new Syrian army and form a jihadist militia in southern Syria, specifically in the Daraa Province, to counter Israeli influence in the region.
The next day, March 4, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a Turkish-language Twitter account for the first time, signaling an intent to engage directly with the Turkish public and influence public opinion. This move suggests that Israel is not only taking diplomatic steps but also seeking to shape the regional narrative regarding Turkish actions in Syria.
Simultaneously, tensions between Turkey and Iran have escalated in recent days. Iran has accused Turkey of betraying Islam by supporting the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This has led to a war of words between the foreign ministries of both countries, increasing geopolitical friction in the region.
Erdoğan’s Statements
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently made strong statements regarding Turkey’s position on Syria, emphasizing Ankara’s long-term strategic interests in the war-torn country.
• “We strive for a stable Syria that includes all its sects, and we will continue to support it.”
• “Inciting sectarian minorities in Syria will not bring security to any country.”
• “We will not allow a new partition of Syria, as happened a century ago.”
• “No single country should bear the full cost of the destruction that Syria has endured throughout the years of war.”
These remarks reflect Erdoğan’s broader vision of Syria as an integral part of Turkey’s regional strategy, with implicit references to Ottoman-era influence over the Levant. His rhetoric suggests that Turkey sees Syria as a potential extension of its historical sphere of influence by referring to Syria as a province (Vilayat), as it was called when it was under the Ottoman Empire.
By opposing any new partition of Syria, Erdoğan is rejecting a repeat of the post-World War I division imposed by Western powers under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. His call for a “stable Syria with all its sects” echoes the Ottoman governance model, which maintained order among various religious and ethnic communities under centralized Turkish rule.
Erdoğan’s statements align with his broader regional policy of reviving Turkey’s stature as a dominant power in the Middle East, a modern version of the Ottoman Empire’s imperial legacy. His rhetoric suggests that he sees Syrians as de facto subjects of a Turkish-led regional order, drawing parallels to past statements by Ottoman sultans who ruled over Syria as part of their empire.
Iran
Bloomberg reported that Putin agreed to Trump’s request to mediate nuclear negotiations with Iran. The proposal emerged from a February 12 phone call and was later discussed in Riyadh on February 18. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the U.S. and Iran must resolve their issues through negotiation, with Moscow ready to facilitate.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refused direct talks with the U.S. Meanwhile, Iran’s military has been conducting extensive air defense drills, revealing new tactics and defense systems.
Iran has surpassed 270 kg of 60% enriched uranium.
Russian mediating fairly is unrealistic given that Russia has allied itself with the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iran.
A more dovish approach to Russia in the Ukraine War and via mediation between Iran and the US is unfavorable to Israel and could prolong the period of negotiation in which Iran could advance with its nuclear program. Israel’s interest remains in striking Iranian nuclear sites rather than a new deal that strengthens Iran’s economy and nuclear ambitions.
Possibility on new Nuclear Agreement
Iran continues to struggle under the economic strain imposed by U.S. sanctions, with President Ebrahim Raisi acknowledging that Iranian oil tankers are facing significant challenges in selling crude oil due to American pressure. Raisi described the current situation as “more difficult than the eight-year Iran-Iraq war”, emphasizing the economic hardships caused by the sanctions.
Furthermore, Qatar, Iraq, and Turkey have reportedly ceased financial transfers to Iran, exacerbating Tehran’s liquidity crisis. Despite these setbacks, Iran remains firm in its refusal to enter negotiations with the United States, citing the Supreme Leader’s directive against diplomacy with Washington.
In a further signal that a new nuclear deal is unlikely, former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif resigned from his advisory role and was encouraged to “return to academia and leave politics”. Zarif, an architect of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement, was long seen as a proponent of diplomacy with the West. His departure underscores the hardline stance of Iran’s current leadership against engagement with Western powers.
Meanwhile, Reuters reported that seven Russian missile experts visited Iran multiple times in the past year. These specialists, who entered Iran using diplomatic passports, conducted inspections of Iran’s underground missile production facilities, fueling concerns that Tehran is seeking Russian expertise to enhance its ballistic missile program—a critical step in developing a nuclear delivery system.
Yemen
A senior Houthi official warned that if the ceasefire in Gaza ends, the Houthis will resume attacks on Israel.
International
Cairo Summit & Gaza “Day After” Plan
The summit was held in Cairo with 22 Arab nations, including Syria (represented by al Julani’s government and the Palestinian Authority). The main focus was opposing Trump’s Plan for Gaza and producing an alternative plan.
Egypt showcased its Proposal which included $20 billion for initial reconstruction in Gaza and $53 billion total. Gaza would be governed by a technocratic committee for 6 months, then transferred to the Palestinian Authority. UN peacekeeping forces would be stationed in Gaza with Egypt and Jordan training the new Palestinian security forces.
They would provide temporary housing for 1.5 million Palestinians in seven locations during reconstruction.
Arab leaders called for the creation of a Palestinian state as part of the process.
Global Jihad
The latest issue of ISIS’ weekly publication, Al-Naba, highlighted recent geopolitical tensions, particularly the confrontation between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House. The publication called on ISIS fighters to exploit these divisions within the Western alliance.
The editorial argued that “the fragmentation of the international Crusader camp will weaken those who rely on it”, urging jihadist operatives to prepare for upcoming opportunities to attack Western targets.
ISIS perceives Western disunity as a vulnerability and aims to leverage internal divisions to weaken international coalitions—a strategy mirroring tactics used by Hamas and Iran against Israel. The group’s leadership believes that social and political fractures in the West will ultimately erode military effectiveness, making it easier for radical Islamist movements to operate
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